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ABSTRACT
The values of the players in an n-person cooperative game
are analyzed by considering a simple auction model in which
outside "entrepreneurs" bid to acquire control of the players.
This bidding procedure always has a Nash equilibrium in pure
strategies, thus yielding a concept of "market values" for the
players. This class of values is easy to characterize and con-
tains the core of the game. The model applies to various val-
uation problems (such as estate auctions, the setting of wage
structures for laborers, or the valuation of divisions of a
corporation) in which indivisible factors are present and there
may be increasing returns to scale.
-iii-
An Estate Valuation Problem
Uncle Rufus, a bachelor, dies leaving his estate to his
three maiden sisters, Irma, Ora, and Mildred. The estate con-
sists of three farm properties plus cash in the bank. Rufus's
will specifies that Irma is to get the hill farm, Ora the prairie
land, and Mildred the main house and surrounding pasture. How-
ever the will also specifies that each sister is to receive an
equal share of the total estate, any differences in the value of
the parcels being made up by a suitable distribution of the cash.
Unfortunately, a dispute arises concerning the value of the
three properties. An appraiser is called in, and gives the fol-
lowing values:
(1)
HF
MH
PL
$130,000
$148,000
$155,000 .
But Irma maintains that the appraisal underestimates the
value of her sisters' shares: the main house and prairie land
together are worth much more than $303,000, since they can be
farmed as a unit, realizing economies of scale. Irma contends
she is being treated unfairly because of the way the property
was divided. But Ora notes that the same argument can be made
against the valuation of Irma's and Mildred's shares, since the
hill farm could also be combined advantageously with the main
house and pasture. Mildred has a similar complaint.
The fact is that the property kept all together as Rufus had
it would be considerably more valuable than the appraised values
of its parts.
So the appraiser is recalled and gives the following esti-
mates:
(2 )
HF & HH
HF & PL
PL & MH
HF & PL & 11H
$310,000
$320,000
$420,000
$550,000 .
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The greatest loss in efficiency is in dividing the main
house from the prairie land, but all combinations of two proper-
ties realize some economies of scale. The conjunction of the
hill farm with the main house/prairie land combination does
not produce any further economies of scale however. The problem
is how to determine the relative values of the three individual
parcels specified in Uncle Rufus's will.
This anecdote illustrates a very general problem: how to
put a value on productive factors individually, given that these
factors have value jointly.
In this paper we propose a way of valuing a collection of
indivisible factors used to produce a single divisible output.
A particular application is the valuation of players in cooper-
ative n-person games with transferable utility.
Production Functions and Games
Let the numbers {1,2, ... ,n} = N denote the available
factors of production, which may be completely indivisible.
The production function is a function v on all possible subsets
of N. We assume that
v (<p) = 0 and v (8) ｾ 0 for all 8 eN
(4 ) v(8UT) > v(8) + v(T) for all 8 , TeN
(1) asserts that production is valuable but we need not
produce, (2) asserts the possibility of joint production. This
format is quite general, and allows for production functions
of virtually any degree of combinatorial complexity, and for any
amount of factor differentiation.
v may also be interpreted as the characteristic function
of a cooperative n-person game with transferable utility. In
this case the players are the factors, and the output of a co-
alition is the total utility it can achieve, which is assumed
to be completely transferable--not only among the players, but
also to agents outside of the game.
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Valuation by Auction
We propose to determine the fair value of the factors by
holding a simultaneous competitive auction for them. By "simul-
taneous" is meant that all factors are bid for simultaneously;
by competitive is meant that there are at least two buyers.
Each of the m buyers (m ｾ 2) is assumed to perceive exactly the
same production function v, i.e. the "true" value of the possible
combinations. The nontriviality of the auction results from the
fact that the values this implies for the individual factors may
not be at all obvious. The competitive bidding process estab-
lishes bounds on what those values should be.
The bidding procedure is the natural one: each bidder k names
k k h h' '11' f h f hthe amounts P1, ... ,Pn t at e 1S W1 1ng to payor eac 0 t e
factors; he is also free not to bid, or to bid for only some of
the factors. Thus a bid is a vector pkconsisting of nonnegative
real numbers ｰ ｾ and blanks (for no bid). The prices resulting
1
from a collection of bids ｻ ｾ Ｑ Ｌ ... Ｌ ｾ ｭ ｽ is the vector of real
numbers ｾ defined by
k
max {p" a}
1 .... k<m 1
Thus the price of i is the maximum bid for i, or, if nothing
is bid, then it is zero.
In order to allow for the efficient resolution of ties, we
assume that the bidders line up in order of the total amount bid.
Thus if k l is first in line, k 2 second, and so forth then Ipk ll ｾk? k m - -Ip -I ｾ ... ｾ Ip I· Ties in the total size of bid are assumed
....... - --
to be resolved by some initially given "alphabetical" ordering
of the bidders.
Given all bids and the resulting line-up, the first bidder
in line takes all the factors for which he bid highest, the next
bidder all the remaining factors for which he bid highest, and
so on. This arrangement allows the bidders to acquire control
of combinations of factors, which is of course their objective.
This arrangement will be called the pure bidding ｭ ｯ ､ ･ ｾ Ｎ
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Equilibrium Prices and the Core
We now formally describe the bidding process as a game.
Assume that the bidders are indexed such that 1 is first in line,
2 d f h ' b'd 12m d 'dsecond, an so ort. Glven 1 s ｾ Ｌｾ , ... Ｌ ｾ ,an assoclate
prices p, the set of factors acquired by bidder 1 is T 1 =
{iEN: ｾ ｾ = p,}. Similarly T2 = {iEN-T 1 : ｰｾ = p,} is the set1 1 1 1
of factors acquired by bidder 2, and so forth. This defines a
disj oint collection of sets T 1 ,T2' ... ,Tm, where U Tk is the setk
of all factors for which some bid was made.
12mThe payoff to each bidder k, given bids ｾ ,p , ... ,p , is
evidently
If Tk = ｾ the payoff is zero. Bids are assumed to be
announced publicly, and bidders can revise their bids in light
of the others'. After a time, we might expect that the bids reach
an equilibrium, in the sense that no bidder can change his bid
and increase his payoff, assuming that all other bidders hold
fast. Any price vector e arising from such a set of equilibrium
bids will be called an equilibrium price vector.
The core of the production function is the set of all
vectors p > 0 such that
-- = ...,
for all SeN
and I p, = v (N)
N 1
Theorem 1. For the pure bidding ｭ ｯ ､ ･ ｬ ｾ e is an equilibrium
price vector for v if and only if p is in the core of v.
The proof is given in the Appendix.
At equilibrium prices p, no bidder buys a set of factors
for more than they are jointly worth, since he could always
simply not bid and thereby avoid a loss. On the other hand,
since such a p is in the core, no bidder pays less than the factors
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are jointly worth. Hence any set T of factors bought by a given
bidder has the property that E p. = v(T}. In other words, every-
T 1
one's payoff is zero.
The specification of those combinations of factors actually
bought by the individual bidders at prices p is called a saLe;
a sale is thus a family of m disjoint sets T 1 , ... ,Tm, and in
equilibrium, v(Tk } = TE Pi for every k. Some of the Tk may, of
k
course, be empty.
In the case of Uncle Rufus's farm, the core exists and con-
sists of all 3-vectors summing to $550,000 that lie on the solid
line segment shown in Figure 1. These vectors represent the
possible equilibrium prices for the properties that could result
from a simultaneous auction.
-- __ 0 •• •
ＨｉｾｏＬ H';. is''';)
.....------'--------------..... ｾ ｩ Ｍ ｬ
Figure 1.
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A given equilibrium price vector such as p = (130,230,190)
could arise in many different ways. For example, with three
bidders p results from the equilibrium bids (to mention but two
possibilities)
first bidder -+ (120,140,180)
second bidder -+ 0,230,190)
third bidder -+ (130,75,190)
as well as from
first bidder -+ (130,230,190)
second bidder -+ (130,230,190)
third bidder -+ (130,230,190) .
In the first case the first bidder gets nothing; the second
bidder gets the main house plus prairie land and the third bidder
gets the hill farm. In the second case the first bidder takes
all three properties.
Nonexistence of the Core and option Holders
Theorem I says that, if the core exists, then a valuation
of the factors by an outside competitive market results in a
vector in the core. This is a pleasant result, since this is
precisely the answer one would expect if the factor represen-
tatives (e.g. the three maiden ladies) try to reach an agreement
among themselves without appealing to an outside market.
However, what happens if the numbers are different and the
core does not exist? In that case it would appear much more
difficult to predict either the result of an internal agreement
or the outcome of an auctioning procedure. Nevertheless there
is a straightforward procedure for determining value in this case.
The key point is to recognize that the ladies may not really
wish to sell their inheritances, but only get the market to
establish fair values for them. In fact, estate auctions are
often held for exactly this purpose, and the device frequently
used to retain the property is for the trustee of the estate to
hold an option that allows him to match any and all other bona
fide offers.
In this procedure, called the bidding with option ｭ ｯ ､ ･ ｬ ｾ
there are two or more bidders and, in addition, an "insider"
who holds an option to meet any and all bid prices established
by the others. The bidding procedure is exactly as before, with
precedence in line determined by total size of bid. But the
payoff structure is different: given a set of bids and the as-
sociated factor prices E, the option holder is entitled to buy
any set of factors he wants at these prices. Evidently his best
response is to buy some set T such that v (T) - L: p. is a maximum.T 1
This leaves the factors N - T, which must be purchased by those
who bid highest for them, the bidders being called up in order.
The fact that the highest bidders have to accept what the option
holder rejects prevents bidders from inflating prices merely to
"spite" the option holder. (The option holder need not buy any-
thing, of course.)
Formally, let p1,p2, ... ,pm be a set of bids, where we may
assume that Ek ｲ･ｰｲｾｳ･ｾｴｳ the-kth highest total bid. (A bid may
contain no entries for some factors, meaning "no bid.") The
kfactor prices associated with these bids are Pi = max{Pi'O},
where Pi = ° if no bids for i were' made.
Given prices p the response of the option holder is to buy
some maximum profit set. The choice of this set is assumed to
depend only on p, not on the individual bids generating p. For
most p there is only one such set, but to deal with ties some
specific tie-breaking rule or response function g must be assumed.
Thus for every p, g (p) is some set T* maximizing v (T) - L: p. over
- - T 1
all T:= N. We say that g is efficient if, moreover, g (p) has
highest value among all maximum profit sets, that is, v(g(p)) >
v(T) for all maximum profit sets T under prices p.
12mGiven p ,p , ... ,p and prices p, define as before the sets
- 1- - - 2
T 1 = {iEN: Pi=Pi}' T2 = ｻｩｅｾＭｔＱＺ Pi =Pi}' and so forth; these
are the factor sets the bidders would get if the option were not
exercised. The sets actually obtained are Uk = Tk - S, where
S = g (p) and the payoff to the kth bidder in line is v (Uk) - L: p ..Uk 1
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Now S is a maximum profit set with profit v(S) - ｾ Pi; thus
by superadditivity
[v(S) - 2P']+ [v(Uk ) - I p.]S 1 U 1
k
whence
for all k.
Hence for any bids the payoffs to all bidders will be nonpositive.
What then is the incentive to bid?
The answer must be the common-sense one that, in practice,
bidders imagine that there is a small chance that the option
holder will forfeit by dropping dead, going bankrupt, or suffering
some other act of God. Moreover, there is no need to engage in
calculations involving the probability of such an event; it seems
safe to assume that each of the bidders will act so as to suffer
no loss if the option holder does exercise his right, but will
at the same time work to increase the prospect of his payoff just
in case the option holder does not exercise his right.
The payoff to the kth bidder in line if the option holder
forfeits is the forfeit payoff
whereas if he does not forfeit it is the nO-forfeit payoff
A set of bids is in equilibrium for the bidding with option
game, and p is a set of equilibrium factor prices, if the no-
forfeit payoff for all bidders is zero, and no single bidder can
change his bid such that his forfeit payoff increases while his
no-forfeit payoff remains non-negative.
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The introduction of the option holder is not only natural
in the context of the problem, it turns out to guarantee that
equilibrium prices always exist.
Before stating this theorem, let us consider the previous
example, now somewhat modified: suppose that the value of the
hill farm together with the main house is $390,000 instead of
$310,000. Consider two bidders A, B, and suppose that A takes
precedence in line over B in case of a tie. Let us further
suppose that they have both read a text on game theory, and
seeing that the core does not exist, begin by both bidding the
nucleolus:
A + (140,240,170)
B + (140,240,170)
At these prices the most profitable sets of properties are
all combinations of two: each such combination has a value of
$10,000 in excess of its price, whereas all three properties cost
together as much as they are worth.
Say the option holder takes the hill farm and main house.
Then A must make good his offer of $170,000 for the prairie land.
Therefore he suffers a loss, since the prairie land is only worth
$155,000. A similar conclusion holds no matter which most profit-
able set the option holder decides to take. The conclusion is
that these prices are not in equilibrium-- they are too high.
Bidder A would do better to lower his prices, since then he at
least does not risk taking a loss.
Next suppose that A decreases his bid as follows and B stays
fixed:
B + (140,240,170)
A + (130,148,155)
B is now first and suffers a loss if the option is exercised.
A + (130,230,160)
B + (130,230,160)
Now A and B get no-forfeit payoffs of 0,
of $30,000 and 0 respectively. At this point
reached. For if B outbids A in total he will
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Next let B change his bid to obtain
B + (130,230,160)
A + (130,148,155)
B is still first, prices are the same as B's bid, and the most
profitable sets are {HF,MH}, {HF,PL}, ｻ ｾ ｲ ｮ Ｌ ｐ ｌ ｽ Ｌ and ｻ ｈ ｆ Ｌ ｾ ｩ ｬ ｩ Ｌ ｐ ｌ ｽ Ｌ
each yielding a profit of $30,000. If at these prices the option
holder buys {MH,PL}, then B gets HF but his payoff is zero; A also
gets nothing. However, if the option holder forfeits, then B
takes {HF,rlli,PL} at a profit of $30,000. Again A gets nothing.
But this is not an equilibrium, since A can raise his bid to match
B's and because of the tie breaking rule, A goes to the fore:
and forfeit payments
equilibrium has been
have to pay too much
for some properties and the option holder could leave him with a
loss, while A cannot lower his bid without losing his desirable
place in line.
Theorem 2. Under bidding with option, an equilibrium prioe
veotor exists for any effioient response funotion, and e ｾ Q is
a set of equilibrium prioes if and only if
(i) N is a maximum profit set,
(ii) no faotor is in every maximum profit set.
The existence of a p satisfying the conditions is easily
seen: beginning with p = 0 choose any player i and raise his price
just until he is no longer in every maximum profit set. At these
prices if there remains any player j who is in every maximum profit
set raise his price just until he is not in every maximum profit
set. Continue raising prices of the players successively in this
manner. The process must terminate, since maximum profitability
can never be less than zero (by virtue of the empty set) and at
termination N is still a maximum profit set. For a proof of
Theorem 2 see the more general Theorem 3 below and its proof in
the Appendix.
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Any vector e satisfying conditions (i) and (ii) above is
called a market value for v.
We note that, for any market value p, p. ｾ v(i) for all i.
ｾ 1 -
Indeed by condition (ii) there is a ｭ｡ｸｩｾｵｭ profit set S not
containing i, but Pi < v (i) would imply, by superadditivi ty, that
S U{i} were more profitable than S, a contradiction.
If the core of v exists, then every vector in the core is
also a market value. Indeed, for any p in the core, maximum
profitability is zero, which is achieved both on N and on the
empty set, so (i) and (ii) are both satisfied. Thus the notion
of equilibrium price vector generalizes the concept of the core
in a natural way. Moreover, the competitive bidding model shows
how the core of v arises as a noncooperative solution of a
"supergame" played for v. But the core--even if it exists for
a given v--need not constitute the only market values for v:
some factors may be able to get more than any imputation in the
core would give them.
Opportunity Costs
In general, items offered at auction often carry reservation
bids or floor prices, which effectively establish lower bounds
on acceptable offers. From the point of the owner of a factor,
the floor price represents either an estimate of the inherent
worth of the factor to the owner, or an opportunity cost, i.e. its
potential value in some context other than the auction. This value
is not generally an "output", hence it is advisable to maintain
a distinction between floor prices and the quantities v(i).
. 0 0 0.] ..
k '} iven floor prlces (P1 ,P2'··· ,Pn) =P , a b1-d 1S now a vector
p consisting of real numbers ｰ ｾ ｾ ｰ ｾ and blanks (meaning no bid) .
Th f . d t . d b 1 . . 12me actor pr1-ces e ermlne y a famlly of blds ｾ ,p , ... ,p is
the vector p defined by
p.
1
k 0 0
= max {Pi' Pi}' where Pi = Pi if no bids are made for i.
k
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A bidder's place in line is now determined by the total
surplus he offers above the floor prices:
are Ordered by the numbers 7T k = ｾ Ｈｰｾ - ｰｾＩ ,
such that k bids for i. ｾ
that is, the bidders
the sum over all i
°It turns out that for any floor prices p ｾ ｾＬ the bidding
with option game always has a strong equilibrium. To describe
these equilibria we define a new game v as follows
v(5) = max
TC5
[v (T) + , for each 5 C N
The value v(5) can be interpreted as the maximum amount that
could be obtained by collecting opportunity costs for some of
the factors in 5 and using the rest to produce.
A critical set is any set 5 whose productive surplus v(5) -
l: ｰｾ is a maximum, and i is a critical factor if i is contained
5 ｾ ) l: °in every critical set. Note that v (N) = v (5 + N-5 Pi for any
critical set 5.
The
T = g(p)
surplus.
response function g(p) is efficient if for every p ｾ
is some maximum profit set having highest productive
Theorem 2 now generalizes as follows.
°p
Theorem 3. Given floor prices pO, an equilibrium price
vector exists for any efficient response function, and p is an
equilibrium price vector if and only if p is a market value for v.
°Theorem 2 is obtained from Theorem 3 by setting p = 0, in
which case v = v. For the proof of Theorem 3, see the Appendix.
Auctioning the Estate
Irma, Ora, and Mildred decide to part with the properties
after all, provided they can get enough for them. Irma is a
little sentimental about the hill farm and wouldn't consider less
than $143,000 for it; Ora is wild about the main house and won't
let it go for less than $200,000, while Mildred could care less
about the prairie and would settle for any price. Thus pO =
(143,000 , 200,000 , 0). The values of the properties are assumed
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to be modified earlier, with the hill farm and main house to-
gether worth $390,000.
The neighbor, meanwhile has got wind of their intention to
sell, and being an old family friend, has secured an option to
match any and all prices that the parcels might fetch at auction.
In this case the auction would yield the unique equilibrium
factor prices
HF $143,000
MH $243,000
PL $173,000
At these prices any singleton set results in a loss for a
buyer. The buyers' profits on the other combinations are
HF & MH
HF & PL
MH & PL
HF & MH & PL
$4,000
$4,000
$4,000
-$9,000
The unique critical set is the main house plus prairie land,
and these are the two critical factors. In equilibrium, the
neighbor will buy the main house and prairie land, and get them
at a bargain: $4,000 less than their appraised value. Moreover,
in equilibrium the hill farm will receive no bids, so Irma will
keep it after all.
In terms of economic efficiency this solution makes sense,
since by assumption the addition of the hill farm to the other
two properties does not further increase productive efficiency
while its utility to Irma is higher than to any outside buyer.
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Conclusion
In summary, two related auction procedures for discrete
productive factors have been described. The bidding procedure
is the natural one: prices are formed simultaneously and com-
petitively by taking the highest bid for each factor. The use
of a precedence scheme for the buyers is a convention that
allows for the equitable resolution of ties. In reality, of
course, buyers will assess the value of the factors somewhat
differently and ties would be a rarity.
Without an option holder an equilibrium only exists if the
core of the production function exists, and in this case the
possible equilibrium factor prices coincide with the imputations
in the core. In the presence of an option holder -- a situation
frequently encountered in practice -- equilibrium factor prices
always do exist.
It might be said that this way of valuing the factors de-
pends very much on the particular bidding procedure chosen.
However, there is a strong argument that this valuation is the
correct one quite independently of the bidding procedure since
exactly the same valuations result if the factor owners, rather
than the buyers, set prices.
Suppose indeed that the factor owners cannot agree on what
auction procedure or other valuation method would be fair. The
simplest solution is then for each factor owner to simply announce
to a market of prospective buyers what he thinks he is worth.
Given announced prices ｾ = (Pl,P2, .•. ,Pn)' the buyers arrive.
The first in line helps himself to a maximum profit set (which
may of course, be the empty set), leaving at best profitless sets
for the others. Now let ｧ Ｈ ｾ Ｉ denote the set of all factors
bought. This will always be a maximum profit set.
The factor owners are engaged in the following non-cooperative
game: the strategy of factor i's owner is to name his price
p. ＾ ｄ ｾ where ｰ ｾ is his opportunity cost, and the payoff to i given1 Ｍｾ 1 1
choices ｾ = (P1,P2, ... ,Pn) is
-15-
Pi if iEg(p)
ｐ ｾ if ｩ ｾ ｧ Ｈ ｰ Ｉ
If g is efficient, a strong equilibrium in pure strategies
always exists for this game. An appropriate measure of the value
of players are their payoffs at such an equilibrium. As shown in
[1] these equilibrium payoffs are precisely the market values for
the game v.
Thus, whether prices are set by the owners of the factors in
the face of a market of buyers, or by the buyers in a competitive
bidding process, the outcomes are the same -- the class of market
values.
-16-
APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 1
in the pure bidding
If Tk is the set of
to k is qk = v(Tk ) -
Let 1,2, ... ,m be the "alphabetical" ordering, and let
1 mｾ , ... ,p be a set of equilibrium bids
p the resulting set of factor prices.
tors acquired by bidder k, the payoff
model,
fac-
Ｇ ｬ ｾ Pi ｾ o.
k
Suppose, by way of contradiction, that some subset of N
yields a positive profit at ｰ ｲ ｩ ｣ ･ ｳ ｾ Ｎ Say S, with profit q =
v(S) - L: p. > 0 is a maximum profit set. If qh' qk > q
S 1
for distinct hand k, then by superadditivity Th UTk would have
profit of at least 2q, contradicting the choice of q. Thus
q > qk ｾ 0 for ｳ ｯ ｭ ｾ k. But then let k change his bid
and offer Pi + E for all i E S and no bid for the other factors.
Then k acquires precisely the set S, and for sufficiently small
E the payoff is larger than qk' a contradiction. Therefore q =0,
that is
for all S ｾ N
Further, qk = 0 for all k. Now the sale procedure implies
that Pi = 0 for all i ｾ T = ｾｔｫＮ Hence
o ｾ v (N) - LPi = v (T) - Lp. ｾ Lqk = 0
N T 1 k
the right-hand inequality by superadditivity.
and P is in the core of v.
Thus v(N) = I p.
N 1
Conversely, let p be in the core of v. Let all bidders bid
p. The first bidder in line buys the set N, and the payoff to
every bidder is zero. Let some bidder change his bid (in fact
up to m - 1 bidders may change) and let the resulting factor
prices be ｾ Ｇ Ｎ Clearly pi ｾ P so no set yields a positive payoff
and no bidder is better off. 0
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Proof of Theorem 3
The market values for v may be characterized in terms of v
and pO as follows (the verification is left to the reader):
(5) all critical sets are maximum profit sets in v (relative
to ｾ Ｉ .
°= P i
for every noncritical factor i.
(7) no factor is contained in every maximum profit set in v
(relative to p).
In the subsequent proof, all statements about prices and
profits are made with respect to v.
To prove Theorem 3, let p be a market value for v, i.e. let
p satisfy (5) - (7), and let g be any efficient response function.
Then by (5), g(p) = S is a critical set. Let aZl bidders bid Pi
for each i E S and not bid for all other factors. We will show
that these bids are in equilibrium.
By condition (6) the resulting set of prices seen by the
option holder is precisely p (since no bid implies Pi = ｰｾＩＮ
The no-forfeit payoff to all bidders is zero, while the forfeit
payoff to the first bidder in line is v (S) - L: p. = q and zeroS 1
to the others.
Now suppose exactly one bidder b changes his bid. Suppose
also that as a result of this change the factor prices are still
p. If b was not first in line he is therefore still not first;
so in case of forfeit the first bidder takes the set S, leaving
at most a zero payoff to b, while under no-forfeit bls payoff is
at most zero. If on the other hand b was first in line, then
under the new bids his no-forfeit payoff is at most zero, while his
forfeit payoff can be at most q. Therefore in any case b is
no better off by changing. Hence the new factor prices pI must
be different from p. Since all bidders other than b stick to
their original bids, b must now be outbidding the others on at
least one factor.
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Let I = {i EN: p! > p. } . b has to acquire all factors in I
1 1
not acquired by the option holder. For fixed j E I, condition
(7) guarantees that there is a set Sj such that j ｾ Sj and Sj is
maximum profit with respect to p. Under p' this set is strictly
more profitable than any set containing I.
Now let S' = g(p') and let T be the set of factors b ac-
quires if the option is exercised. Since S' is a most profitable
set under p' and S' UT contains I, the above remark implies
v(S' UT) - r p! <v(S') -
SlUT 1
r p!
S' 1
By superadditivi ty of v it follows that v (T) - E p! < 0, soT 1
b now suffers a loss. Therefore the original bids were in equi-
librium.
To prove the
be an equilibrium
factor prices are
the option holder
necessity of the conditions (5)-(7), let ｾ Ｑ Ｌ ｰ Ｒ Ｌ ...pm
set of strategies for response function g. The
k o}p. = max {p.,p .. If the option is exercised,
1 ＱＲｫｾｭ 1 1
acquires the maximum profit set S = g(p), and
the bidders acquire U1 ' ... ,Um. Since in equilibrium all bidders'
payoffs are zero (if no-forfeit), v (Uk) - U\ Pi = 0 for all k.
Therefore by superadditivity the set S* = S-UU 1 UU2U ... UUm is
also a maximum profit set under p. The sale procedure implies
that p. = p? for all i Ei S* . Hence S* is also a most profitable
1 1
set under pO, that is,S* is critical. Now for any critical setS
( 8)
whereas
whence
( 9)
v (S) -i; p.
S 1
v(S) - ｾｰ＿
S 1
ｾ (p. -p?)
S 1 1
>
< v(s*) - r p.
S* 1
= v (S*) - ｾ p?
S* 1
r (p. -p?)
S* 1 1
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Since S was an arbitrary critical set,
(5) and (6) above for p.
p? for all if!. S*,equality holds in (8) and (9),
1
all i ｾ S.
Since Pi =
o
and p. = p. for
1 1
this establishes conditions
-
It remains only to prove (7). For this, several facts need
to be established concerning payoffs in equilibrium.
Consider the first bidder in line. The option holder (if
he does not forfeit) acquires a maximum profit set Shaving
profit q = v(S) - §Pi and the first bidder acquires T1 - S = U1
having profit zero, T 1 being the set of all factors for which he
bids highest. By superadditivity, S UT 1 is also a maximum
profit set. Suppose then that the first bidder extends his bid
by bidding Pi for all i E S - T 1. He will get the same forfeit
payoff, and a ｮｯＭｦｯｲｦ･ｾｴ payoff of q. Since by hypothesis the
bids were in equilibrium, this change cannot improve 1's posi-
tion, hence 1's no-forfeit payoff was already q,i.e., T 1 was a
maximum profit set.
(10) Thus in equilibrium the forfeit payoffs are q for the first
bidder and zero for the others.
Consider now the last (mth) bidder in line, and let T
m
be
the set of factors acquired by m if the option is forfeited.
If Pi > ｰｾ for some i E Tm then the auctioning procedure implies
that Pi = ｰｾ > ｰｾ for all k < m such that ｰ ｾ is defined. There-
fore the last bidder could lower his bid on factor i, not lose
his place in line, and still acquire precisely the set T
m
if the
option is forfeited but realize a higher profit. Moreover his
no-forfeit payoff will be no lower than before. This situation
contradicts equilibrium. Hence p. = ｰｾ = p? for all i E Tm.111
Moreover for all i f!. T either no one bids for i and p. = pQ,. ork m 1 1
else p. = p. for some k < m.
1 1
(11) Hence the last bidder in line can drop out and the factor
prices will remain unchanged.
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Suppose now that condition (7) does not hold, and let
factor j be in every maximum profit set. Since j ｾ ep, ep could
not be a maximum profit set; hence profits q are positive.
Ep.
J
in
Let pE: be the price vector such that ｰ ｾ = p. for i ｾ j and
-1 1
= Pj + E. Choose E: > 0 such that under prices ｾ ｅ Ｚ Ｌ j is still
every maximum ｰ ｲ ｯ ｦ ｾ ｴ set. Let SE = ｧＨｾｅＩＬ so j ESE' and let
= {i EN - Sc- : p. > p ｾ l-
c. 1 1
Now let the last bidder in line, b, change his bid as follows:
for each i ESE he bids ｰ ｾ Ｌ and for each i in Se: he bids Pi - 0, for
sufficiently small 0 > o. These are all the factors he bids for.
His total surplus bid then exceeds the first bidder's, so he
goes to the head of the line. Moreover, by (11) the new
factor prices are precisely ｾ ｅ Ｎ Since bidder b is only high
bidder on the set SE' his payoff is q - E > 0 if the option holder
forfeits and 0 if he does not. Thus by ｾ ｏ Ｉ b is better off than
before, a contradiction. This completes the proof of Theorem 3.
D
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